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Abstract: A temporal phase mask encryption method is proposed and 
experimentally demonstrated to improve the security of the stealth channel 
in an optical steganography system. The stealth channel is protected in two 
levels. In the first level, the data is carried by amplified spontaneous 
emission (ASE) noise, which cannot be detected in either the time domain 
or spectral domain. In the second level, even if the eavesdropper suspects 
the existence of the stealth channel, each data bit is covered by a fast 
changing phase mask. The phase mask code is always combined with the 
wide band noise from ASE. Without knowing the right phase mask code to 
recover the stealth data, the eavesdropper can only receive the noise like 
signal with randomized phase. 
©2014 Optical Society of America 
OCIS codes: (060.2330) Fiber optics communications; (060.4785) Optical security and 
encryption. 
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1. Introduction 
The substantial increase in the usage of fiber optic networks requires proper protection of the 
sensitive information that may be carried. Optical steganography is an effective way to 
provide secure data transmission in the physical layer of a network. Hiding signals in the 
system noise of the public channel, optical steganography prevents the eavesdropper from 
detecting the existence of the signals [1]. The hidden signal is called a “stealth channel”. 
Previous approaches to optical steganography were based on temporally stretching the optical 
pulse by chromatic dispersion [2–6]. The stretched pulse had a sufficiently low amplitude so 
the signal is buried under the noise floor of the system. Recently, a new method has been 
experimentally demonstrated [7,8]. The stealth data is carried by the amplified spontaneous 
emission (ASE) noise from an erbium doped fiber amplifier (EDFA). The ASE-carrying 
signals inherently have the same spectrum as the system’s ASE noise. In the time domain, 
because the ASE has a short coherence length, the optical delay at the transmitter and receiver 
need to be exactly matched to detect the signal, which provides a large key space for the 
stealth channel. However, mechanical delay lines are required to achieve optical delays with 
large bandwidth. This limited the speed at which the delay could be changed on the order of 
seconds [7]. If an eavesdropper deploys a faster scanning technique, then the key pair based 
on optical delays is vulnerable to a threat. Therefore, a method employing a fast changing key 
is needed to further protect the stealth data from being detected. 
Another method to protect the data transmission in the physical layer is optical encryption 
[9]. Optical encryption provides a fast encryption process that enables both changing the key 
at the rate of data transmission and real time data processing with zero latency [10,11]. The 
requirement of having a fast changing key in optical steganography can be satisfied by 
optically encrypting the stealth data, and provides further protection of the stealth channel. In 
previous work, optical encryption has been applied to the steganography system based on 
stretching optical pulses by chromatic dispersion [12]. Optical encryption was achieved by 
covering each stretched pulse with a temporal phase mask. Although this method can improve 
the security of the stealth channel, the phase mask itself is unsecure if an eavesdropper 
matches the dispersion. The eavesdropper can compare a stretched pulse and a phase mask 
covered pulse to retrieve the phase mask. 
In this paper, a phase mask encryption method is proposed based on ASE-carried stealth 
signals. This method offers two unique advantages that are missing in previous systems. First, 
the phase mask code, which was previously unsecured, is protected by the noisy properties of 
ASE. Designed to have bandwidth much wider than the stealth data, the phase mask is 
indistinguishable from the wideband noise of ASE. Without a priori knowledge of the phase 
mask code, the receiver cannot separate the noise and phase mask code. Second, the phase 
mask can change with every bit of the stealth signal, which is on the order of several 
nanoseconds. This rate of change is a billion times faster than the rate of changing optical 
delays mechanically. Even the if an eavesdropper with a fast scanning technique could match 
the optical delay, he could not follow the rapidly changing phase mask code. 
2. Experimental setup and principle 
The experimental setup utilizes the short coherence length and noise properties of ASE [Fig. 
1(a)]. These two properties provide two levels of protection to the stealth channel. The first 
level corresponds to the short coherence length of ASE noise. Experimental results show that 
the coherence length of ASE noise is 372µm [7]. The optical delay length difference between 
the light path 1 and 2 is designed to be 10m in this experiment, so the eavesdropper needs to 
search for the 372µm length in the 10m range to demodulate the data. Even if the 
eavesdropper deploys a fast scanning technique and finds the coherence length before the 
transmitter changes the optical delay, the data is still protected by the second level of security, 
which is the phase mask. The phase mask technique benefits from the noise properties of the 
ASE. The ASE noise has a flat bandwidth that goes up to at least 5GHz [13]. In the 
experiment, both the stealth data transmission and the phase mask encryption are 
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implemented by modulating the phase of the ASE noise at the transmitter [Fig. 1(b)]. The 
data rates of the stealth channel and phase mask are 250Mb/s and 4Gb/s, respectively. The 
bandwidth of the phase mask data is 16 times wider than the bandwidth of the stealth data, so 
the phase mask data is 16 times noisier than the stealth data. The extra noise protects the 
phase mask, and they are indistinguishable if the phase mask code is not known. Only by 
using the same phase mask code to recover the signal at the receiver can the phase difference 
in the two light paths 1→3 and 2→4 be cancelled [Fig. 1(a)]. The phase mask also corrupts 
the stealth data. If the eavesdropper tries to use an electronic low-pass filter to remove both 
the phase mask and the high frequency noise, the remaining amplitude of the stealth signal is 
low enough to be submerged in the noise. 
 
Fig. 1. Experimental Setup (EDFA: erbium-doped fiber amplifier; P: polarizer; ASE: amplified 
spontaneous emission; PM: phase modulator; PD: phase demodulator; SSMF: standard single 
mode fiber; DCF: dispersion compensation fiber; WDM: wavelength division multiplexer). (b) 
Schematic diagram of the stealth channel; only 8 chips are drawn for each bit. 
The stealth transmitter and receiver pair is a fiber-based Mach-Zehnder interferometer and 
the phase and polarization of the stealth signal are sensitive to temperature and mechanical 
vibration. The temperature and mechanical vibration can cause the amplitude of the eye 
diagram change with time and degrade the bit error rate (BER). To minimize the effect of 
mechanical vibration, all the fibers are physically stabilized either on an optical table or in 
packaged boxes. To minimize the effect of temperature fluctuation, the stealth transmitter and 
receiver are packaged separately and a temperature control system is provided for the 
packages. 
The eye diagrams show that the received signal amplitude is greatly reduced without 
phase mask recovery [Figs. 2(a)-2(d)]. A low-pass filter with a −3dB cut off frequency 
250MHz is used at the receiver. Clear eye diagrams are shown with the phase mask recovery 
[Figs. 2(a) and 2(c)]. If phase mask recovery is not used, the phase mask at the transmitter 
corrupts the stealth data, and the stealth signal at the receiver becomes low enough to be 
buried under the noise [Figs. 2 (b) and 2(d)]. If the eavesdropper does not use a low-pass filer 
and tries to receive the phase mask code directly [Fig. 2(e)], the code is covered by the noise 
from 0Hz to the bandwidth of phase mask code, which is 4GHz. The signal is noisy enough 
that the bit error rate (BER) cannot be measured [Fig. 2(e)]. 
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Fig. 2. Comparison of eye diagrams with and without phase mask recovery. (a) Phase mask 
code 1010101010101010 with phase mask recovery. (b) Phase mask code 1010101010101010 
without phase mask recovery. (c) Phase mask code 1010100101101001 with phase mask 
recovery. (d) Phase mask code 1010100101101001 without phase mask recovery. (e) Eye 
diagram of receiving phase mask data directly. 
3. Experiment results and analysis 
3.1 Hidden signals in the public channel 
The receiver of the public channel cannot detect the existence of the stealth channel in either 
the time or the spectral domain [Fig. 3]. The public channel employs DPSK modulation with 
a data rate of 10Gb/s. A distributed feedback laser with wavelength 1551.72nm is used as the 
signal carrier of the public channel. The signal in the public channel is pseudorandom binary 
sequence (PRBS) with length 231-1. An EDFA to provide additional ASE is added in the 
public transmitter to simulate the system noise in the public channel [Fig. 1]. The power of 
the stealth channel is designed to be much lower than the power of the public channel. In this 
experiment, the power of the stealth channel is 21dB lower than the public channel. 
Moreover, the spectrum of ASE noise-carrying stealth channel ranges from 1520nm to 
1560nm. Wavelength division multiplexer (WDM) filters with a −3dB bandwidth of 0.5 nm 
are used to separate the public channel and the stealth channel [Fig. 1(a)]. Only the ASE noise 
in this 0.5nm spectral range interferes with the public channel. Therefore, there is no 
difference between the eye diagrams of the public channel with the stealth channel [Fig. 3(a)] 
and without the stealth channel [Fig. 3(b)]. The stealth channel only causes a 0.2 to 0.3 dBm 
power penalty to the public channel [7]. In the spectral domain, the ASE carrying the stealth 
data has the same spectrum as the ASE noise in the public channel, so the eavesdropper 
cannot tell whether it is the stealth channel or the system noise that already exists in the 
public channel [Fig. 3(c)]. In the experiment, an additional EDFA is used to emulate the noise 
in the public channel [Fig. 1(a)]. 
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Fig. 3. (a) Eye diagram of public channel with stealth channel. (b) Eye diagram of public 
channel without stealth channel. (c) Spectrum of public channel with and without stealth 
channel. 
3.2 Code space analysis 
The fast changing phase mask code requires a large code space. In this section, we 
demonstrate that more than 18,000 codes are available for the phase mask. Each stealth 
channel bit is divided into 16 chips by the phase mask, so the available combination is 216 = 
65,536. The best codes for the phase mask are the codes that can reduce the amplitude of the 
stealth signal to a small value. We simulate all 65,536 codes and plot how many codes are 
available to reduce the signal amplitude lower than a certain value [Figs. 4(a) and 4(b)]. In the 
simulation, the stealth data is a 215-1 = 32,767 bit pseudorandom binary sequence (PRBS), 
and a low-pass filter with cut-off frequency 250MHz is used at the receiver. The reduced 
signals from several sample codes are experimentally measured to compare with the 
simulation results. Figure 4(c) shows the original signal amplitude without using the phase 
mask code. Figures 4(d)–4(h) show that the sample codes reduce the amplitude of the signal 
in Fig. 4(c) to 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% and 25%, which corresponds to the red dots in the 
simulation results [Fig. 4(b)]. The measured signals show that if the eye diagram amplitude is 
reduced to lower than 15% of its original value [Figs. 4(d)–4(f)], then there is no eye opening, 
and the number of available codes for this is more than 4,000 [Fig. 4(b)]. If the eye diagram 
amplitude is reduced to lower than 25%, but higher than 15%, the data rate of the stealth 
channel can be roughly measured, but the bit error rate of the stealth data is still undetectable 
[Figs. 4(g) and 4(h)]. The number of available codes in this range is more than 14,000 [Fig. 
4(b)]. 
The codes not only reduce the amplitude but also randomize the phase of each stealth bit 
[Fig. 4(h)]. The position of the peak in each stealth data bit depends on both the stealth data 
and the phase mask code [Fig. 5(a)]. Comparing the distribution of stealth data peaks with 
and without using the phase mask, the simulation of 215-1 stealth bits shows that the phase 
mask code randomizes the distribution of peaks in each stealth data bit [Fig. 5(b)]. Without 
using the phase mask recovery, the peak position of the stealth bit changes with every bit, 
which makes it impossible for an eavesdropper to find the sampling position to detect the 
data. In summary, the noise-like signal in Figs. 4(d)–4(h) results from both the reduction of 
the signal amplitude and the randomization of the signal phase. There are more than 18,000 
codes that can reduce the signal amplitude to lower than 25% of its original value and also 
randomize the phase. 
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Fig. 4. (a) The number of available codes that can reduce the eye amplitude below a certain 
percentage. (b) Enlarged view of the region marked by red in (a); the red spots correspond to 
(d)-(h). (c) Eye diagram of the stealth channel without phase mask. (d) Phase mask code 
1010100101101001 can reduce eye amplitude to 5% of the amplitude in (c). (e) Phase mask 
code 1100011001011001 can reduce eye amplitude to 10%. (f) Phase mask code 
1101011001001110 can reduce eye amplitude to 15%. (g) Phase mask code 
0011011010101100 can reduce eye amplitude to 20%. (h) Phase mask code 
1011100010010101 can reduce eye amplitude to 25%. 
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Fig. 5. Simulation of the stealth signal with phase mask code 1011100010010101, which is the 
code used in Fig. 4(h). (a) Comparison of temporal signal with and without phase mask 
encryption. (b) Distribution of the signal peaks in the stealth bit. 
3.3 Power penalty of the phase mask 
The phase mask causes a 0.3dBm power penalty to the stealth channel at a BER of 10−6 [Fig. 
6]. In the experiment, a PRBS with length 231-1 is used as the signal of the stealth channel. 
The stealth channel is designed to include noise and is not error-free. The noise in the stealth 
channel comes from ASE, and when the phase mask recovery is not used, the stealth signal 
with reduced amplitude can be buried in the noise. In addition, as discussed in section 2, the 
noise also protects the phase mask. As the bandwidth of the phase mask code is 16 times 
wider than the stealth data, the noise accompanying the phase mask is 16 times stronger than 
the noise accompanying the stealth channel. Forward error correction with Reed-Solomon 
codes can be used to correct a BER of 10−6 to be error free. The power penalty of the phase 
mask is caused by the misalignment of the phase mask at the transmitter and the receiver. The 
misalignment could exist in both the time and the modulation depth. The 0.3dBm power 
penalty is low because the power of the public channel is 21dB higher than the power of the 
stealth channel. 
 
Fig. 6. BER performance versus received signal power for stealth channel with and without 
using phase mask encryption. 
3.4 Data rate and transmission distance analysis 
Since the stealth channel is carried by the full spectrum of ASE noise, which spans from 
1520nm to 1560nm [Fig. 3(c)], the system has less tolerance to dispersion compared with 
traditional fiber optics systems. This limits both the data rate of the phase mask and the 
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transmission distance without the dispersion compensation. We experimentally measured that 
if the DCF is not used, the dispersion from 25km standard single mode fiber (SSMF) expends 
the sharp rising edge of a signal to one with 3ns rising. By using the criterion B∆T<1, where 
B is the data rate of the phase mask, which is 4Gb/s, the time delay (∆T) caused by the 
dispersion has to be less then 250ps. Considering both the rising edge and the falling edge, the 
system can only tolerate uncompensated dispersion from 1km SSMF. Although this limits 
resilience of this system in a dynamic network, the precise requirement of dispersion 
compensation can actually provide another layer of security. We have demonstrated that the 
dispersion can expend the key space for optical steganography [8]. 
Besides dispersion, the wide optical spectrum of ASE noise also limits the signal to noise 
ratio for long distance transmission. When an optical amplifier is used to amplify the signal in 
a traditional long distance communication system, an optical filter is deployed to remove the 
ASE noise from the optical amplifier. However, if ASE carries the signal, the optical filter 
cannot be used. The ASE carrying signals cannot be separated from the new generated noise 
ASE. 
The ASE also has wide band radio frequency noise, which protect the phase mask from 
being detected. As a tradeoff, the wide band radio frequency noise limits the data rate of both 
the stealth channel and the phase mask. The stealth channel with a higher data rate is 
accompanied with more ASE noise. Our experiment shows that the BER increase while the 
stealth channel date rate increases [Fig. 7]. The data rate of the phase mask is designed to be 
high enough so that the ASE noise with the same bandwidth accompanied can protect the 
phase mask data from being detected. However, the data rate of the phase mask cannot be too 
high because the receiver needs to temporally overlap the received phase mask with the 
recovery phase mask. If the phase mask is accompanied by more noise, it will degrade the 
recovery process and cause more power penalty. 
 
Fig. 7. Measurement of BER for different stealth channel data rates. 
4. Conclusion 
We have proposed and experimentally demonstrated a phase mask encryption method to 
cover stealth data bits and protect the security of the stealth channel. The phase mask is 
implemented by imposing phase modulation on the ASE noise, and can be easily changed by 
using different codes in the phase modulation. The phase mask code itself is protected by the 
wideband noise from the ASE, which is designed to be 16 times stronger than the noise in the 
stealth data. More than 18,000 codes are available for the phase mask. Without knowing the 
right phase mask code to recover the signal, the received signal has its amplitude reduced to 
less than 25% of its original value, in addition to having a randomized phase. Furthermore, 
the phase mask introduces only a 0.3 dBm power penalty to the stealth channel. 
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